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In the Critique of the Power of Judgment,¹ Immanuel Kant argues that when we
form a judgment of taste, the representation goes together with a demand that
we require others to share.² Some commentators note that the aesthetic feeling
in a judgment of taste and its expectant universality seems to display a norma-
tive necessity in the explicit judgment itself,³ and that the expression of this nor-
mative component is sometimes stated as a claim to which everyone ought to
conform.⁴ In this paper, I argue that the normative component of taste and its
concomitant demand should not be interpreted too strongly as an actual expect-
ation, but rather as only a conceivable possibility. Toward this end, I examine
several passages for the declaration of taste to call into view certain caveats
which suggest that Kant’s description of an intersubjective demand arising con-
comitantly with a judgment of taste functions only as an “analogical ought,” i.e.,
that the demand of taste is expressed as if the satisfaction I feel in a judgment of
taste can possibly demand universal assent.
1
The third Critique is an extraordinary attempt by Kant to produce a unified aes-
thetic theory that argues for a peculiar feeling which arises from the subject’s
special capacity to make judgments of taste, and finds necessary entailments
in the disinterested pleasure that others are required to share. In contradistinc-
tion to a judgment in cognition, which employs determinate or fixed concepts,
judgments of taste are reflective acts which do not aim to schematize or subsume
objects under corresponding concepts. In the First Introduction, Kant describes
the act of reflection as comparing and holding together “given representations
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either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept
thereby made possible”,⁵ and in the Second Moment of universality, he writes
that such reflection is unfettered in the free play “since no determinate concept
restricts them to a particular rule of cognition”.⁶ Because no concept is deter-
mined in reflection (but only made possible), a beautiful object is one for
which this “taste in reflection” produces sustained pleasure in a self-determining,
subjective activity that transcends any conceptual determination. Subsequently,
the upshot of the free play produces a feeling of pleasure that is not attributable
to the anticipated satisfaction of cognitive or practical interests, but rather to a
uniquely disinterested pleasure in the harmonious, “reciprocally animating”
power of the cognitive faculties, which is conceivably shared by all judging sub-
jects.
2
Although Kant is careful to articulate the grounds for how a judgment of taste is
formed and constituted, he also devotes considerable attention to how such
judgments can fail to obtain.
In the First Moment of taste, Kant argues that in order to make a judgment of
taste one must abstract from any interest one may have in the object, and reflect
solely on the form of beauty, which produces a disinterested and free satisfac-
tion. Kant distinguishes beauty from the agreeable and the good by arguing
that taste is neither based on any of the body’s sensory modalities nor is it de-
termined from concepts of cognition. If a judgment of taste were conditioned ei-
ther by the senses or by concepts, our judgment would not be free or pure. In-
stead, Kant argues that a judgment of taste needs to be free of external
interests, desires, and influences, and must be based on a power of judgment
which is not only subjective, but also inter-subjectively available to all. Given
the arbitrariness and contingency of desires and inclinations, if aesthetic pleas-
ure in beauty were derived solely from desires or inclinations, claims to taste
would be impossibly varied and conflicting, leaving us in a de gustibus non
est disputandum state of aesthetic affairs which would silence any claim to uni-
versality.
The self-determining aspect of disinterestedness is important for Kant in
order to establish a freedom from external influences which would undermine
 Kant: EEKU, AA 20: 211.
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the possibility of any human subject ever forming a pure judgment of taste. Al-
though Kant does not explicitly attach an intersubjective demand to his explica-
tion of how a judgment of beauty has to be disinterested and free from determi-
nation from without, we nevertheless can discern a requirement that the quality
of disinterestedness applies not only to a single judging subject, but also to all
judging subjects. The moment of disinterestedness thus possesses both a narrow
and a wide scope of aesthetic application: it is narrow insofar as it pertains to an
individual subject in correctly forming a judgment of taste; it is wide insofar as it
also pertains to all other subjects and across every single judgment of taste. Sub-
sequently, we can also perceive a double caveat attached to the moment of dis-
interestedness. First, unless a judgment of taste is free from interest, inclina-
tions, and desires, it cannot be considered to express the reflective predicate
of beauty because it most likely is expressing either a feeling of sensual pleasure
or trading in the subsumption of objects under concepts. Second, a failure at the
level of disinterestedness precludes any hope for the possibility of linking the
satisfaction I feel before a “beautiful” object with any claim of universality, leav-
ing us again in an arbitrary, contingent, and radically relative state of aesthetic
affairs in which there is no disputing taste.
In Kant’s Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste, Béatrice Longuenesse
questions certain aspects of Henry Allison’s support of Kant’s claim that because
the feeling of satisfaction which grounds the judgment of taste is disinterested, it
also requires the universal agreement of others. Instead, she agrees with Paul
Guyer, who argues that a judgment of taste might very well be disinterested
but nevertheless possesses no legitimate claim to universalizability.⁷ Longue-
nesse appeals to Guyer because she argues similarly that “the fact that the pleas-
ure is elicited by the mental activity itself and is, in this sense, disinterested, is
not a sufficient ground for asserting that it is universalizable.”⁸ In response to
this view, I have two concerns over the notion that one can disavow disinterested
pleasure in playing a key role in the universality of one’s satisfaction before a
beautiful object. My first concern is that the “mental activity” which elicits pleas-
ure in a judging subject is the constitutive reflective act of the free play of the
imagination and understanding, which does not aim to subsume an object
under a determinate concept in the employment of some kind of rule. Disinter-
estedness and universality are therefore inextricably linked because the “mental
activity itself,” i.e., the free play’s capacity to schematize without a concept,
 Longuenesse: Kant’s Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste, 152. See also, Guyer: Kant
and the Claims of Taste, 177.
 Longuenesse: Kant’s Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste, 152.
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would be hindered if it operated under interested and fixed conditions, which
would subsequently work to render the free play itself an impossible human cog-
nitive capacity.
My second concern has to do with the universal “shareability” of the cogni-
tive powers under the free play. Kant argues that the human capacity for the free
play is conceivably shared by all judging subjects who can then expect to justify
speaking in a universal voice. However, as we have seen with the caveats that
have to be avoided at the level of disinterestedness, the arbitrary, contingent,
and radically relative influences of interests, inclinations, and desires would
also effectively cancel out any such shared human membership in judging beau-
ty, as well as stifling any possibility of speaking in a universal voice. Longue-
nesse states that disinterestedness is not a sufficient ground for universalizabil-
ity, but it seems that it is indispensable not only for the free play’s power to elicit
feeling and judgment (for otherwise the ‘free play,’ i.e. the “mental activity” of
which she speaks, would not be free), but also for its capacity to be universally
shared by all judging subjects. Kant further develops the indispensable relation
between disinterestedness and universality in the Second Moment of the Analytic
of the Beautiful, which, as bold as it is in postulating a general demand attached
to a judgment of taste, also betrays a measured and modest aspect of his theory
that I want to make explicit.
3
Although Kant argues that a judgment of taste always goes together with a cer-
tain claim to universality, he does not explicitly develop this accompanied aes-
thetic demand until the opening sections in the Second Moment of taste. If some-
one claims “this x is beautiful” free from interest or inclination, the claim equally
presupposes that everyone else should agree.⁹ Kant relates that if a judgment of
taste is disinterested, the satisfaction and demand of universality can be “pre-
supposed” or tacitly assumed as also the case in everyone else. However, we
should note that this presupposition merely states the possibility for a universal
demand attached to the subject’s satisfaction in judgments of taste, and not a
confident or assured demand.
This is not to overlook certain passages where Kant seems to accord a stron-
ger claim of aesthetic assent. For instance, in describing the transcendence of
 Cf. Kant: KU, AA 05: 211.
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beauty from merely subjective satisfaction to a greater universal (allgemeine) de-
mand, Kant states:
For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases merely him. Many things may have charm and
agreeableness for him, no one will be bothered about that; but if he pronounces that some-
thing is beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction of others: he judges not mere-
ly for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.
Hence he says that the thing is beautiful, and does not count on the agreement of others
with his judgment of satisfaction because he has frequently found them to be agreeable
with his own, but rather demands it from them. He rebukes them if they judge otherwise,
and denies that they have taste, though he nevertheless requires that they ought to have it;
and to this extent one cannot say, “Everyone has his special taste.” This would be as much
as to say that there is no taste at all, i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could make a rightful
claim to the assent of everyone.¹⁰
The passage above seems especially strict in its demand for universal demand,
but note Kant’s use of the analogical clause, viz. “he judges not merely for him-
self, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things” (my
emphasis). Here Kant reminds us that the demand for universal assent is analo-
gous to an empirical judgment, but it is only analogous because empirical judg-
ments employ determinate concepts, while aesthetic judgments of taste do not.
Despite the fact that such judgements involve personal taste, they nevertheless
function as if they were statements of fact. Kant’s use of analogy reminds us
that taste is neither under the domain of nature nor is it subject to reason. In
other words, a judgment of taste functions as if the quality of beauty were a
real, objective property of the object judged. The normativity of demand, I
argue, is also analogous, and is therefore only at the level of a conceived possi-
bility rather than actuality. Subsequently, while the demand of universality in-
deed looks severe in the passage above, its stridency is mitigated by the reflec-
tive, a priori nature of reflective judgment.
My reading of the conceivable possibility of universality in beauty’s demand
for universal assent is corroborated by Kant when he considers the unique na-
ture of the taste of reflection, which “makes supposedly generally valid (public)
judgments”¹¹. Recall that in the First Introduction, Kant described the act of re-
flection as comparing and holding together “given representations either with
others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 212 f.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 214.
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made possible”.¹² Kant argues that acts of reflection are engaged in ascertaining
the possibility of finding or discovering concepts.
A taste of reflection, Kant states, “can nevertheless find it possible (as it also
actually does) to represent judgments that could demand such assent universal-
ly”¹³.It is important to read this sentence in a way that does justice to the modal
terms ‘possible,’ ‘actual,’ and ‘could.’ Kant is stating that it is possible for a taste
in reflection to actually represent a certain type of judgment, namely, one that
could demand universal assent. For to say that something ‘y could x’ is merely
to ascribe a possibility to y that it can x (and not that it ‘will’ or ‘does’). Subse-
quently, although it seems reasonable to hold that under the right conditions a
feeling of satisfaction can demand universal assent, Kant tempers the expecta-
tion because of uncertainty over whether certain caveats to taste (e.g., interest,
desire, conceptual smuggling, et cetera) have been avoided (hence relegating the
demand to a “could”):
Whether someone who believes himself to be making a judgment of taste is in fact judging
in accordance with this idea can be uncertain; but that he relates it to that idea, thus that it
is supposed to be a judgment of taste, he announces through the expression of beauty. Of
that he can be certain for himself through the mere consciousness of separation of every-
thing that belongs to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains to him;
and this is all for which he promises himself the assent of everyone: a claim which he
would also be justified in making under these conditions, if only he were not often to of-
fend against them and thereby make an erroneous judgment of taste.¹⁴
This passage is striking for how Kant concedes (i) that we can never be quite sure
we have sufficiently abstracted from interest and desire and (ii) that the attune-
ment of our cognitive powers are actually schematizing without a concept to
properly cast a judgment of taste. Consequently, if this uncertainty lingers in
the consciousness of whether our feeling of satisfaction is pure, the same uncer-
tainty also covers beauty’s demand for universal assent. Subsequently, while we
can posit the possibility for taste and its concomitant demand, we can never
posit its actual expectation either for ourselves or anyone else.
Although this might seem like a shortcoming to our human faculties of cog-
nition, this modesty or humility before taste is not a failure by any means, but
rather a vindication of the judging subject who nevertheless possess the capacity
to engender taste and its concomitant demand as a possibility (regardless to
whether they actually obtain).
 Kant: EEKU, AA 20: 211.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 214.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 216.
3002 José Luis Fernández
Bereitgestellt von | Johannes Gutenberg Universitaet Mainz
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 24.01.19 15:48
4
We find more evidence for this Kantian humility before taste in the Fourth Mo-
ment of exemplary necessity, i.e., the modality of taste: “a necessity of the assent
of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that
we are unable to state”.¹⁵ In other words, if I state my feeling that ‘Vermeer’s
Young Woman with a Water Pitcher is beautiful,’ I also make a claim to universal-
ity by asserting that other subjects ought or should find this composition beauti-
ful. Subsequently, my judgment presupposes a principle through which the sub-
ject possesses a sense for what “ought” also to be pleasurable for other subjects
with similar attunements of the cognitive powers, though I can never quite state
a rule its following.¹⁶
However, Kant writes that this “ought” is only “uttered conditionally.” That
is, on the presupposition that we share in common a disinterested reflection in
the cognitive faculties.¹⁷. Subsequently, Kant considers that because exemplary
necessity obtains the assent of everyone to a judgment of taste, we must presup-
pose a common sense.¹⁸ The common sense, however, while certainly normative,
does not itself guarantee that the ‘ought’ of beauty’s demand will obtain. Keep-
ing with his claim in § 8 that it is possible for a taste in reflection to actually rep-
resent a certain type of judgment that could demand universal assent, Kant ar-
gues that a judgment of taste does not rest on the presupposition that
everyone will necessarily assent to the satisfaction one takes in a certain object.¹⁹
The ‘ought of taste only stipulates the possibility of reaching mutual concur-
rence. Subsequently, the Fourth Moment of exemplary necessity is similarly tem-
pered by the same uncertainty that were expressed by the caveats in the First
and Second moments, which continues to suggest that, all things being equal,
the status of the “ought” or demand of beauty is only at the level of possibility.
It would be at the level of actual expectation “if only,” Kant writes, one were cer-
tain of avoiding the caveats of taste, but one can never be quite certain.
Kant concludes the Fourth and final moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful
by commenting on the normativity of exemplarity, and considers whether taste
might “only [be an idea of a faculty] yet to be acquired […] so that a judgment
of taste, with its expectation of a universal assent, is in fact only a demand of
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 237.
 Cf. Kant: KU, AA 05: 238.
 Cf. Kant: KU, AA 05: 237.
 Cf. Kant: KU, AA 05: 238.
 Cf. Kant: KU, AA 05: 239.
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reason to produce such unanimity in the manner of sensing”.²⁰ It is worthwhile
to note that even this proleptic passage, which anticipates a relationship be-
tween taste and morality, still only considers this analogical connection in the
same manner that Kant has been considering throughout the Analytic of the
Beautiful; namely, that the satisfaction one has in judging beauty and its con-
comitant demand is understood as a possible, but nonetheless remarkable, hy-
pothesis.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 240.
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